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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
vestors who would have standing to bring an action is not so
restrictive as to destroy this congressional purpose. Above
all, the courts should construe these rules and regulations
with the idea that every shareholder is entitled to a complete
and truthful statement of those facts which might tend to
influence his vote, regardless of how important the solicitor
might consider them to be.
William R. Bebout
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-Child Custody: Statutory
Preference in Favor of the Mother is Not
Applicable in Proceedings to Modify a Prior
Custody Order
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in the recent case of Gib-
bons v. Gibbons' held that in an action between parents to
modify a custody order the statutory preference2 given the
mother cannot apply. To successfully move the court to grant
a change in custody, the parent asking for modification of
the prior order must generally sustain a twofold burden of
proof:
1. Show a permanent, substantial and material change
of condition which directly affects the best interests
of the minor child;
2. Show that as a result of this change the minor child
would be substantially better off with respect to its
temporal and its mental and moral welfare if parental
custody were modified.2
442 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1968) (5-4 decision).
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1961), which provides in part:
2 As between parents adversely claiming the cus-
tody or guardianship, neither parent is entitled to
it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the
child be of tender years, it should be given to the
mother ....
3 Gibbons v. Gibbons, 442 P.2d 482, 485 (Okla. 1968).
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The parties were divorced in 1962. Pursuant to the di-
vorce decree, the mother received custody of their four and
one-half year old son. Approximately three months later, up-
on joint application of the parties, custody was transferred
to the father. For the next five and one-half years the boy
lived with his father. In 1967, on the basis of changed cir-
cumstances, the mother applied to the district court asking
that she be given full custody of the boy. Subsequent to the
last custody order the mother had remarried and she and
her husband wanted the boy and said they were able to pro-
vide him with a good home.
The trial court specifically stated that the father was a
fit person to have custody and even commented that he had
done an outstanding job of raising the boy. They were active
in church, Scout and other activities together; they had a
good relationship with each other and with the boy's mother;
and excellent arrangements had been made for supervision
of the boy while the father worked. The boy was healthy,
progressing satisfactorily in the parochial school he attend-
ed and had presented no unusual disciplinary problems.
The district court, however, granted the mother's motion
for modification and awarded her full custody. The court
based its decision on the mother's changed living conditions
(her remarriage and ability to provide a home) and upon
the statute providing that all other things being equal, cus-
tody of children of tender years should be given to the
mother.4 The father appealed.
In Oklahoma, authority to modify a custody order is
specifically given by statute.5 The courts have held that modi-
fication of a custody order is proper upon showing a material
4 OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1961).
r OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (1961), which provides in part:
[T]he court .. . may modify or change any order
in this respect [dealing with guardianship, custody,
support and education of minor children] whenever
circumstances render such change proper . . ..
1970]
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change in circumstances; 6 however, this change must be one
which materially affects the temporal, moral and mental
welfare of the child.7 There are no set standards to measure
the amount of change required which leaves the courts with
very broad discretion.8 Each case must be decided on its own
merits in light of the court's primary concern of providing
for the child's best interest.9 In essence, it is not the changes
which must be measured but rather the result these changes
would have on the welfare of the child. Even though a change
in circumstances is required before the order can be modi-
fied, this fact alone, without showing a substantial benefit
to the child, will not support modification of the prior cus-
tody order.10
The mother is not entitled, as a matter of law, to the
custody of her children despite the universal recognition
8 See, e.g., Perry v. Perry, 408 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1965) (show-
ing of changed circumstances); Taylor v. Taylor, 387 P.2d
648 (Okla. 1963) (whenever best interests of the child de-
mand it); Tisdell v. Tisdell, 363 P.2d 277 (Okla. 1961) (un-
der proper circumstances).
7 Earnest v. Earnest, 418 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1966); Young v.
Young, 383 P.2d 211 (Okla. 1963); Miracle v. Miracle, 360
P.2d 712 (Okla. 1961); see Foster & Freed, Child Custody,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615, 623 (1964).
8 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 362 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1961); Ness v. Ness,
357 P.2d 973 (Okla. 1960); see Foster & Freed, Child Cus-
tody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 438 (1964); Inge, Problems in
Child Custody Cases, 26 ALA. LAW. 327, 340 (July 1965).
9 Morgan v. Morgan, 268 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1954); Ford v. Ford,
206 Okla. 561, 245 P.2d 75 (1952); Childers v. Childers, 202
Okla. 409, 214 P.2d 722 (1950); see Oster, Custody Proceed-
ings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAt.
L. 21 (Spring 1965).
10 Stanfield v. Stanfield, 350 P.2d 261 (Okla. 1960); see 27B
C.J.S. Divorce §317 (2a) (1959).
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that the mother is the natural custodian of her young." There
are certain intangible factors-such as the love, care and in-
fluence a mother can provide-which will be weighed by the
court in determining what is in the child's best interests.
In some cases prior to Gibbons, the court seemed to have
felt compelled, in light of the statutory preference in favor
of the mother, to modify prior custody orders upon a show-
ing by the mother that she had remarried and was able to
provide a home in which to raise the children.1 2 Although
the court presumably was at all times guided by what was
in the best interests of the child, they frequently used the
statutory preference as the touchstone for their decision. It
seemed to be presumed that if the mother could provide a
1 See, e.g., Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okla. 317, 229 P.2d
602 (1951) (statutory preference given mother in divorce
proceedings); Logan v. Logan, 197 Okla. 88, 168 P.2d 878
(1946) (proceedings between paternal grandparents and
mother); Bell v. Bell, 196 Okla. 130, 163 P.2d 548 (1945)
(application of statutory preference for the mother upheld
with respect to custody provision of divorce decree).
See Comment, Child Custody: Considerations in Grant-
ing the Award Between Adversely Claiming Parents, 36
S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 258 (1963). California's statutory pro-
vision, CAL. CIV. CODE § 138 subsection 2, is identical to
OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1961). The Comment concluded
that the first part of the rule, that children of tender years
should be given to the mother, is based on a universal con-
cept that the mother is the natural guardian and custodian
of her child, and that there is no substitute for mother's
love. It was nevertheless questioned whether things are
ever equal as required by the state. See also Foster & Freed,
Children and the Law, 2 FAm. L.Q. 40, 41 (1968). The
mother usually prevails over the father, although the "best
interests" test theoretically gives each parent an equal
chance.
12 See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 365 P.2d 974 (Okla. 1961). (In
reversing the trial court, the supreme court found that the
mother's remarriage, home ownership and resumption of
the role of housewife were significant changes in circum-
stances which for the best interests of the children re-
1970]
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suitable home then everything was equal and the statutory
preference for the mother was applicable.
The inconsistencies in the cases previous to Gibbons were
due, at least in part, to the failure to make the distinction
between matters relating to custody in the divorce decree
and those matters relating to an application to modify a pre-
vious custody order. The court had quoted and cited cases
involving custody in divorce decrees, where the statutory
preference had been applied, to support their decisions in
applying the same statutory preference in actions to modify
a previous custody order.13
quired giving custody to the mother. Although both par-
ents were fit, the statute required them to give custody to
the mother.); Miracle v. Miracle, 360 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1961).
(Here the court applied the preference and reversed the
determination of the trial court that the child's interests
would be best served by giving custody to the father. The
mother, who remarried, had moved to Italy and this was
not enough to overcome the application of the preference
in her favor since Jan was a child of tender years and the
mother could provide a suitable home.); Ness v. Ness, 357
P.2d 973 (Okla. 1960). (The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's holding that the mother's allegation of remarriage
and ability to provide a suitable home and properly care
for the children was a sufficient change in circumstances
in light of the statutory preference to give her custody,
although there was nothing in the record reflecting ad-
versely on the fitness of the father.) But cf. Stanfield v.
Stanfield, 350 P.2d 261 (Okla. 1960). (An application for
modification made eight years after the prior order and
alleging the remarriage and home ownership of the mother,
without evidence as to the children's present situation, was
not sufficient reason to require transplanting the children
to a totally new environment.)
'1 See, e.g., Ness v. Ness, 357 P.2d 973 (Okla. 1960). (This case
cited Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okla. 317, 229 P.2d 602
(1951), which was an appeal from the custody provision
of a divorce decree.); Miracle v. Miracle, 360 P.2d 712 (Okla.
1961). (This case cited Blackwood and Bruce v. Bruce, 141
Okla. 160, 285 P. 30 (1930) which was an appeal from the
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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The Gibbons court took a hard look at the statutes in
question14 as well as their holdings in previous cases and de-
termined that paragraph 2 of OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1961)
could not apply in an action between parents to modify a
prior custody order. The court said that under its previous
decisions the person asking for the modification had the
burden of proving changed circumstances and, as a result of
the change, the best interests of the child required modifi-
cation of the custody. If the person asking for the change
sustained the burden of proof, things obviously were not
equal. If things were not equal, then the statutory preference
given the mother could not apply since it was expressly con-
ditioned upon things being equal. If the burden of proof
was not sustained, then at the most things were equal and
for that very reason custody could not be changed from one
parent to another.
The effect of the Gibbons decision is that the mother can
no longer rely on the statutory preference in actions to
modify a custody order. She will now have to show that the
child would be substantially better off if his custody were
changed. The court has not limited what the trial court may
look to in determining what is in the best interests of the
child; e.g., the age of the child or the fact that the mother has
remarried and could provide a good home for the child. The
court will probably continue, as in the past, to give a good
deal of weight to the advantages a mother can supply a child.15
divorce decree that gave custody of minor children to the
father.)
14 OILA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1961); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277
(1961).
'5 See, Note, Modification of Divorce Decrees With Respect
to the Custody of Minor Children-Oregon, 2 WLAmETTE
L.J. 216, 223 (1963). Reached the conclusion that although
the Oregon statute was amended to specifically provide
that no preference should be given to either parent, the
courts would continue to prefer the mother though they
would phrase this in general terms of the welfare of the
1970]
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